

TOP SECRET

25X1



20 January 1962


25X1

Copy No. C 89

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

25X1

20 January 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. USSR: Pravda articles suggest further developments in Soviet dispute with Peiping and Tirana. (*Page i*)
2. France-Algeria: Negotiations apparently at a point where neither side feels there is room for further compromise. (*Page i*)
3. Latin America: Communists and Castro sympathizers planning actions to discredit OAS foreign ministers' meeting. (*Page ii*)

25X1

5. Vietnam: Hanoi announces organization of Marxist-Leninist party in South Vietnam. (*Page iii*)

25X1

7. African Conference: Failure to invite provisional Algerian government results in withdrawal of Casablanca and Tunisian participation. (*Page iv*)
8. Laos. (*Page v*)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 January 1962

DAILY BRIEF

USSR: Two recent Pravda articles contain new attacks on the Albanians and Chinese and may foreshadow further developments in the Soviet-Albanian dispute, such as the severing of Tirana's ties with the Warsaw Pact. They may also be intended to impress on the Chinese that continued support for the Albanians might lead to a break in party relations. The articles also may suggest that Molotov and other members of the anti-party group will be expelled from the Soviet Communist party.

25X1

France-Algeria: Both the provisional Algerian government (PAG) and the French appear to feel that secret negotiations have reached fundamental issues on which each feels there is no room for compromise.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

negotiations were at a standstill "for the time being" over French demands for exclusive control of the referendum to be held in Algeria after a cease-fire. the PAG would rather have negotiations break down than agree to this demand. A French Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer in Paris on 18 January that government circles feel some agreement must be reached within the next few weeks or "other measures" would have to be considered.

25X1

the PAG is uncertain whether to proceed with negotiations in view of its belief that the influence of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) is steadily increasing even among conservative Moslem elements in Algeria. PAG suspicions that De Gaulle is either unwilling or unable to control the OAS are unlikely to be dispelled by the

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

25X1

25X1

[French Government's "determination" to combat the OAS threat, announced after the 17 January cabinet meeting.]

[Backup, Page 2)

25X1

Latin America: [Communists and other elements sympathetic to Castro throughout Latin America are seeking to discredit the Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers' meeting scheduled to open 22 January in Punta del Este. They are planning strikes, student demonstrations, parades, and rallies timed to correspond with the opening of the meeting, to demonstrate Latin American solidarity with the Cuban revolution. In Cuba, a series of rallies and demonstrations during the ensuing week will culminate on 28 January in the second meeting of the "National Assembly of the Cuban people," a mass rally called to give their "answer" to any decision reached in Punta del Este. The Bolivian Government is reported to believe that worker demonstrations in La Paz could reach large proportions, and Argentine Communists may attempt demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Buenos Aires.]

25X1

[Youth groups and students are expected to play a leading role in the activities. Students from Chile, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil are expected to join their Uruguayan colleagues in the 97-mile march, which began 17 January, from Montevideo to Punta del Este. The march is being escorted by Uruguayan security police, and is proceeding without incident. The Communists have had difficulty in recruiting marchers, and the column of less than 400 is probably a disappointment.]

[There are no indications that Latin American security forces fear any of the demonstrations will get out of hand. The Montevideo police recognize that Communists and pro-Castro-ites have a potential to cause serious disturbances, but feel]

20 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

25X1

[this is a real threat only if workers already on strike in the area join the demonstrations.]

Vietnam: To encourage the belief that Communists in South Vietnam are all indigenous patriots, Hanoi has announced the organization of a separate Marxist-Leninist party in the South. The manifesto of the new "Vietnam People's Revolutionary party," as broadcast from Hanoi on 18 January, repeats the language used by the North Vietnamese Communists to describe the Viet Cong objectives of overthrowing Diem, forming a coalition government in the South, and negotiating "peaceful reunification" with the North. The hard-core Communist elite, who direct military and political subversion in South Vietnam, will use the new party to control their semi-overt political vehicle, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

20 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii


25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200010001-1

Pravda Attacks on Molotov and Chinese Communists

The two Pravda articles strongly attack Molotov, other members of the antiparty group, and the Albanians and Chinese who share their views. An 18 January article by party ideologist P. N. Pospelov, marking the 50th anniversary of the 1912 Communist party conference in Prague, states that the party will never tolerate either right- or left-wing "liquidators." The historic significance of the Prague conference, according to Pospelov, was that the party was strengthened when it expelled the Menshevik "liquidators," suggesting by analogy that the antiparty group can expect the same fate.

Pospelov also notes that Lenin's way of handling deviationist "foreign groups" was to go as far as "a complete organizational rupture." Another Pravda article of 17 January sharply condemns domestic and foreign "dogmatists" for their opposition to peaceful coexistence and refers, by implication, to the Chinese as "enemies" of Soviet foreign policies.

Pospelov's article provides a good indication of the sensitivity of the Khrushchev leadership to the use, by its opponents, of statements by Lenin to cast doubt on current policies. This is a practice of the Chinese Communists, and also what Molotov apparently did in his letter to the central committee last October. The Chinese have indicated that they will not retreat from these positions nor drop their support for the Albanians, even in the face of further Soviet intimidations. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

French-Algerian Negotiations Apparently
Approaching Showdown

[redacted] the PAG cannot accept any method under which France alone controls the machinery of the referendum to be conducted during a transitional period, since the PAG feels that in the past, the French have ensured victory for themselves by manipulation of voting procedures.]

[redacted] the rebels and the French are also at odds over when the transitional period would begin. PAG officials are said to desire this immediately after a cease-fire, with the PAG taking over internal security in Algeria as well as supervision of the referendum. The French want the transitional period to begin only after the conclusion of formal negotiations following a cease-fire. The rebels reportedly feel they cannot accept this procedure, because should the open negotiations fail they would find themselves with their guerrilla bands dispersed and nothing to show for their concessions. A compromise may be possible whereby the French would acknowledge PAG authority over some areas--areas which French security forces have for all intents and purposes already surrendered to FLN control.]

[The PAG, [redacted] has "new and grave doubts" about the possibility of reaching any workable accord until Paris takes "concrete and public action" against the OAS. [redacted] the PAG now estimates that at least three fourths of the non-Moslem population in Algeria, along with 20 percent of the Moslems, sympathize with the OAS. The PAG is said to be especially concerned about the "OAS spirit" that is steadily affecting wealthy, reactionary Moslems opposed to the rebels' concept of a socialist Algeria.]

[The French Foreign Ministry official indicated that it seems impossible to drag out secret pre-negotiations much longer while the situation in Algeria continues to deteriorate. He still held out hopes that local tension might subside once an agreement between France and the PAG is reached.] [redacted]

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP77T00975A006200010001-1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/05/15 : CIA-RDP77T00975A006200010001-1

TOP SECRET